Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law by Bratton, William W.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2005 
Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law 
William W. Bratton 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law 
Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal Theory Commons, 
Philosophy Commons, Privacy Law Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Work, 
Economy and Organizations Commons 
Repository Citation 
Bratton, William W., "Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law" (2005). Faculty Scholarship at 
Penn Law. 877. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/877 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: 
Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
vVelfare, Dialectic� and Mediation in Co:rporate La-vv 
Will iam W. Brattont 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61 
l. Categories of Debate ............................................... ....................................... 62 
II. Doctrinal Context: The Purposes of  Corporate Law ..................................... 64 
III. The Scope and Nonnative Content of Regulation ....................................... 66 
IV. The Boundaries of the Finn and Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7l 
V. Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74 
Conclus ion ......................................................................................................... 76 
�0 - / 
Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 2:1, 2005 
60 
Welfare, Dia lectic, and Mediation i n  Corporate Law 
Welfare, Dialectic, and IVIediation in Corporate La'tv 
Wil liam W. Bratton 
INTRODUCTION 
Bi l l  Kle in extends an idealistic and progressive invitation with the Criteria 
for Good Lcnvs of Business Association1 (the Criteria). The structure of  our 
debates, he says, prevents us from join ing the issue. The discourse w i l l  move 
forward if we can isolate core components on which we agree and d isagree. 
The invitation, thus directed, is well-constructed. To faci litate engagement, 
each criterion is set out as pari passu with each other. And there is a good 
reason for the inclusion of each listed criterion. Each has an establ ished place i n  
public and private l aw jurisprudence. Each has influenced results, coming forth 
as salient in one or another area of l aw, in one or another regulat ion or case. We 
can, then, agree in the abstract to take each criterion seriously. Klein b ids us 
then to culi, modify, and restate. so as to identify more clearly the goals we 
hold out for corporate law. The remainder of this essay takes up that invitation, 
taking our debates to the Criteria, taking the Criteria to our debates, and taking 
both to the l aw itself. It suggests that the criteria on which we can agree l i e  at a 
h igher level  of generality than the Criteria: corporate law makes us a l l  welfare 
consequential ists
2 \Vho agree that good corporate law is about encouraging 
productivity. We differ over the means to that end in debates that have over 
time evolved away from the ideological and tO\vard the functional . Absent an 
ex ante set of empirica l ly verifiabl e  formulas for productive business 
organization, we are left to our debates. 
Part I offers a contrasting conceptual framework-a list of ongomg, 
unresolved debates and their principal components. Part Il goes on to identify 
two core and generally accepted objectives in the corporate law we have 
inherited-freedom of action for management and the minimization of the cost 
of capital. Part III evaluates the two theoretical paradigms that dominated 
corporate law during the 20th century, the trust paradigm of Berle and Means 
and the contractarian paradigm of law and economics, showing that each in 
turn lost salience due to a failure to adhere strictly to the core objectives thus 
identified. Part IV considers the firm's legal boundaries, showing that they too 
fol low from the core objectives and that their adherence to those objectives 
l. 2 8ERKEL[Y BL'S. L.J. 13 (2005) 
2. At kast in the tight confines of corporak law discussions. !n the conte:{t of our d.:bates. ::1 
morally motivated case for. s:ly, constituent rights 1vill be accompanieJ by a fully de·;eloped 
consequential case. A given discussant"s grounding of a e:.;sc in t:conornic welfare does not necessarily 
imply a philosophical attachment to consequential ism. 
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triggers resistance to theoretical calls for social responsibility and constituent 
empowerment. Part V tums to the terms of the shareholder-manager agency 
relation, a subject matter implicating tensions between the dual purposes of 
freedom of action for management and the minimization of the cost of capital. 
Corporate law mediates these tensions with open-ended terms and piecemeal 
resolutions. Although theorists have offered meta-level means to resolve the 
tensions. the practice has never responded by endorsing these theories. 
I. CATEGORIES OF DEBATE 
The Criteria come forth as a series of independent normative assertions. They 
do not interact, interrogating one another. Such an interactive process would 
trigger debates with predictable patterns. Four such patterns are described 
below, each comprised of binary opposite positions. Multiple conceptual 
overlaps spill across the four categories; political, methodological, and 
doctrinal affinities vary from debate to debate. Thus might a given discussant 
gravitate to a right-side position in one debate and a left-side position in 
another debate. But one constant perspective unifies one side of the binaries in 
all four categories: ma instream law and economics writers are likely to 
gravitate to the right side in eve ry discussion. 
Categ!Jiy ( 1): Debates aboui the appropriate scope of regulation and the 
degree of' reliance uccorded private ordering in solving problems. Three 
binaries describe positions taken in these debates: 
Public v. pr ivate 
Mandatory v. enabling 
federal v. state 
Th':: public/private contr:::1st concerns the characterization of the problem, 
public denoting a wide range of affected interests and subject matter 
appropriate for regulation and private denoting a nanow range of interests 
limited to a class of voluntary participants. The mandatory/enabling contrast 
goes to tile mode ofregu!atory response, with mandates constraining choices of 
actors in firms and enabl ing responses leaving them the option of framing their 
own regulations. The federal/state binary references the historic pattem of 
regulatory ailocation. Under an informal federalism norm, federal law 
:>.ddrcsses trading mark,�i:s, adding disclosure, antifraud, and insider trading 
mandates in pursuit of a stated public interest. All other corporate subject 
rnatter:; concern internai atTairs and presumptively are left to the states. The 
:;tare::. cor!strc.inc:d by the charter competition system, priviiege private ordering 
a�·HJ L:nabiing so1ution��. BuL because the federal-state regulatory allocation i�-; 
i!C>t S<:'t constitu[J'�:naliy. the pr,:;sumption favoring state control periodically 
yields to ne\v federal regulation, triggering ongoing debate. 
Cut,cgcw·; C): Debmes abu�tt the objecrives rl regulation and normarive 
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priorities. Five binaries capture the tenor of these debates: 
Trust v. contract 
Fairness v. efficiency 
Substance v. process 
Protection of expectations v. dynamism 
State enforcement v. reputational enforcement 
Positions described by these binaries amount to more pa11icular expressions 
of the concepts motivating the first category of debates: a public 
characterization and a willingness to motivate the left-side binaries, \Vhile a 
private characterization and a preference for private ordering solutions motivate 
those on the right side. The !eft side implants the concept of trust at the legal 
firm's core. It asserts that corporate law empowers managers without imposing 
the requisite degree of responsibility. I t  follows that corporate Jaw should 
impose substantive duties of fair dealing to protect the expectations of the 
firm's disempowered actors. Private ordering being inadequate to achieve these 
purposes, state enforcement is necessary. Arguments from the right side use the 
concept of contract to impel the legal firm toward the end of pennitting more 
efficient dispositions of assets in a dynamic economic environment. A 
preference for reputational enforcement follows. For some it also follows that 
fiduciary Jaw should be subject to reversal by private ordering. And, where 
fiduciary interventions do occur, process solutions that remit decision to actors 
within the firm are prefeJTed to direct review of management action. 
CategcJ!y (3): Debates about the boundaries of· the )inn and the jlrm 's 
responsibility to outsiders. Here a single binary captures the matters at stake: 
Outsiders (other constituents) v. insiders (shareholders and managers) 
The outsiders appear on a standard list of corporate constituents excluded 
from corporate fiduciary protection and remitted to self-protection through 
contract-employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and communities. 
Debates over this hard result touch on a range of subject matters, including 
limited liability, takeover defense, employee rights, and financial contract 
interpretation. Discussants draw on the concepts described in categories (1) and 
(2), ranging public values .. fairness, and protection of expectations ::1gainst 
private ordering, contract, and dynamism. 
Categm�v (4): Debmes about the terms qfrhe co;pomte agency relationship 
and the allocation of outhoritv >vithin the jirm. Here three binaries suggesr 
themselves: 
Entity v. agency 
Management discretion v. shareholder choice 
�·/lanageriaiism v. shareho lder value 
These debates follow from a theoretical ambiguity at the base of corporate 
doctrine. In the classical doctrinal conception, the corporation is an ·.:ntity and 
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the powers of the board of directors are original and undelegated. Even as the 
shareholders elect the board, they are not accorded the rights of principals in an 
agency relationship. Unfortunately for the goal of doctrinal coherence, 
corporate law also frequently lapses into an agency characterization, the lapses 
being much encouraged by the economic theory of agency. The ambiguity in 
the legal model opens the way for an ongoing contest over the line dividing 
management and shareholder authority within the finn, a contest centered on 
topics like shareholder access, proxy regulation, and takeover defense. 
Summary. The dialectic presentation implies that the debates do not resolve, 
with meta-political preferences and unverified notions about productive 
incentive alignments determining arguments made and conclusions drawn. But 
dialectic can lead to synthesis, if not in the abstract, then in history. Indeed, 
legal doctrine synthesizes dialectically opposed positions in practice. Famous 
cases achieve high-profile status for the very reason that binary opposites from 
theoretical debates come to play on their facts. Courts work through the 
dialectic tensions in situation-specific ways, making no attempt at general 
theoretical resolution. The process is similar, although more highly politicized, 
wh en a proposed regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission works 
its way through the notice and comment process. Restating, the law mediates 
theoretical disputes in specific situations. 
II. DOCTRINAL CONTEXT: THE PURPOSES OF CORPORATE LAW 
If it is synthesis that interests us, then we need to look at practice as well as 
theory. Concepts competing in our dialectical debates have operated in history 
so as to detem1ine regulatory results, bequeathing a context. Now, a regulatory 
framework cannot by virtue of its own existence establish its own legitimacy 
(or goodness). It takes a theory to do that. Nor does competitive evolution in 
history guarantee a single, first-best contextual outcome. Comparative 
corporate govemance teaches us that ours is only one of many possible legal 
frameworks within which actors can competitively produce a widget or 
construct and operate a communications network3 Nor, finally, can it be 
J.ssened that the context controls. The nom1ative enterprise is theoretical, and at 
a theoretical level everything remains contestable even if the doctrinal context 
tends toward stasis. 
But the context does provide a framework for taking stock of our categories 
of debate and for sorting the Criteria. Some of the debmes go directly to 
3. See. e.g, M;:,rco Becht ct al.. Corpora/e Cu1·unance and Coll/rol 58 (ECG! Finance \Norking 
Paper No. 02. 2002). ami/able ui http://ssrn.comiabstl·act=3-l3-l6l (''It is nor possible to concluclc on the 
basis of •economic analysis alone that there is a unique set of optimal rules that are universally �1pplicablc 
to all corpor�ltions and economies. just :.ts thc:n? is no single political constitution that is uni\·ersally best 
for ail nations") 
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cutting-edge doctrinal issues; others proceed despite settled doctrinal results, 
challenging the context. Similarly, some Criteria prove salient and determine 
results. Others matter less. Some matter not at all. If we were to accept all of 
the Criteria in theory, the sorting process would teach us how good or bad 
corporate law is. Contrariwise, to the extent we accept a doctrinal result that 
traverses a criterion, we eliminate it from the list. In the alterative, we may just 
disagree about the fit between the Criteria and the context, returning to our 
dialectical debates. 
Turning to the context, a bottom line purpose of corporate law can be 
identified readily. The purpose is economic: drawing on the usual formulation, 
corporate law seeks to maximize the wealth generated by firms. That usual 
fonnulation might be relaxed in recognition of the fact that no one really knows 
when wealth has been maximized: corporate law should facilitate the attempt to 
maximize the value of the firm. A narrower formulation favored by 
many-maximizing shareholder value-is deliberately avoided here. The 
shareholder value maximization norm follows from a pm1icular theory of the 
optimal incentive alignment within the finn, a concept contestable in theory._; 
That theory, while influential in practice, has never been detem1inative. 
The general purpose of vvealth maximization can be broken down into two 
primary compvnents, each of which implies a corollary. 
ASSET SIDE 
Facilitate long-term investment 
Facilitate delegation of 
decisionmaking 
(State corporate law) 
: 
I 
LIABILITY SIDE 
Facilitate lowest cost of 
capital 
i I i ' 
-�  b-� 
----- ------
Facilitate liquid market 
(Federal securities law) 
'· ·---·-- ·--�---�---- -·----.. ·--·-- -�--------�----------·------�- ---·-.. ·-·--J 
-L Rcf.-.;rcnct' is !nadt tu thcur-::tic1l 
transferring control bcn\·ccn debt :Jnd 
!ncomple!f! Con/mcis 
OC\\·atripont & Jean Tim!c. J 
rnoclt:ls addre�::;ing optirnal atTangen1r.:nts for and 
interests. Sec. e.g., Philipp--:: & P�nr1ck 8()]-[c�n . .  -!;: 
59 RE\' Eco\·. STUD . .:_�73 ( 1092): \LHhias 
f)i!hf und Ec;uiry S:.::curi!il.!:·; und .\Junug'.�'�'-
!09 Q.J. ECO"�- l027 (1994). Sec ul\·n \iich:1cl C. Jc!1sen (:::_ Kc\·ir� J. 
R.cmunerorion. fFhcrc n·e ·n:�' Been. l--lo,\· ft'c c·ur Thc'I"L'. U'hur _-!re the Proh!cn;s, and Ho\\· ru Fix Thein 
15 (f::C(jJ hn�ll1(c Paper "Jo. -+-f. :2004). U\uiiohl<! a/ l3()5 
('"[C]onsi:-:;tc:nl \vith ·stakeholckr lltTib '.\·111 be CtJnccrncd 2;beut r:::lation:�: \\·id: 
oll their Cl_institu•.?ncie�.;_ A t!rn1 cannot tna:.;_irni;�c \-�due if it tiH� interest of ib stakehuldcT.�;_''). 
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One set can be situated on the left side of the balance sheet, and the other on the 
right side. On the left side. it is corporate law's job to encourage long-term 
investment and the risk-taking implicated therein. That purpose implies a 
corollary-facilitation of a delegation of decision-making authority from the 
providers of capital to the expert managers who deploy it. (The corollary 
extends over to the right side of the balance sheet to include substantial 
management discretion over financing.) On the right side, it is coqJorate law's 
job to facilitate investment in producing assets at the lowest possible cost of 
capital. A corollary again is implied: the law should secure the presence of 
liquid trading markets in corporate securities. With the objectives in place, 
corporate law articulates means to the ends. The evaluative framework is 
functional and consequential, so the word "effective" may better describe the 
emerging criteria than does the term "good." 
This sounds like an attempt at high theory: abstract criteria placed on the 
table to compete with Klein's. And, in fact at this level of generality, I would 
predict w·idespread theoretical concunence. Even so, the present exercise is 
descriptive and the subject matter is the doctrine. State corporate law emerged 
in its present form in Nev; Jersey between 1888 and 1896, taking shape as an 
enabling regm1e that accorded management a zone of freedom of action 
respecting assets and finance The means to the end vvas mandated management 
agenda control over investrr1ent and financing decisions, the terms of the 
corporate contract, and corporate combinations. The framevvork changed little 
during the t'..venrieth century. Subsequent innovation occurred prirnarily at the 
federal leveL centering on the federal securities lmvs. There the purpose \vas 
the assurance of liquidity, an essential means to the end of rhe luwcst possible 
cnst of capitai in a system characterized by widespread holding of securiti.::s. 
l!l. THE :SCOPE .\:'\0 NORMATIVE CONTENT OF RLC!�L.\ TiC_J'·.: 
No1.:v let us check for tlK: fit between tht: cmvorate ia\v purposes just 
•cicmified am: the dialectics described in debate categories ( 1) ami !1). To 
high!ighr the fit. this section \races the evolution ofcot-porate legal theor:,. T-.\o 
1lk'<)rr::ticai par:JC!\gms dominated corporate law in the micl- to Jate-20;!; CCiitlir)·. 
s u\:c:::·cd ing 01L: anurber it! time. The first. a trust pmad igrr;, J\:Ct: i \'eel 
nrticulation in 19.3= by· f-\clolf Berie and Garcliner fv'leans in 
c ··{ ·ure !0l'OfJ::..)r(r. It \vas eclipsed Jrouncl t 9 
!;::trddigm Tit�lt \)i·i�lm1tcd m econornics during the i 960s :md 1 ··1 
:·'�!rJc/e;·;t 
}_c:t us ;uok fir��t at Ber1e and Ivieans. Enabling corporate Ll\Y� [hey· s��id. 1l�!d 
-�����cl1itated lh,: appeJr:.:tncc 8nd. success of the iarg�:. n-:t�tSS··producing. 
Lianagr.'nicnt-i�'(JntroPccl coq::;oration. This had been ;J rcc'.ctivc �·::1thcr thnn ::� 
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facts. But the law thereby had b ecome implicated in the creation and 
perpetuation of an unsatisfactory separation of ownership and control. The big 
corporations of the 20th century had split the classical entrepreneur ial function 
between salaried executives, who sat atop hierarchical organizations, and 
anonymous equity participants, who held small stakes and prized market 
liquidity over participation. This presented problems of competence and 
responsibility absent in an ideaL classical capitalist world i nhabited by self­
employed individual producers. I n  the classical model, market competition 
effectively controlled the producers, constraining both the incompetent and the 
greedy and legitimating private economic power. B ut corporate mass 
production on a large capital base broke those parameters, with finm taking on 
significant attributes and powers, social as well as economic. Industrial 
oligarchs exercised unified control over the wealth under their charge,  and the 
law played a role in investing the power.5 Therefore, said Berle and Means, 
corporate property should no longer b e  deemed private property.(, That 
assertion in turn supported a presumption favoring new regulation. 
Berle and Means recommended no pervasive system of government 
oversight, however. Instead they focused on the problem of  management self­
dealing in an enabling context. Corporate insiders were writing the ir O\\n 
contrscts. with immunity clauses and waivers of  shareholder rights allowing 
much diversion of corporate profit to managers' pockets7 The law, said Serle 
and Means. would do a better job if it were rewritten to follow basic principles 
of trust law. More particularly, there should be  a pervasive equitable l imit3tion 
on powers grante d to corporate management (or any other group within the 
corporation) by the enabling system: power should be exercisable only for the 
ratable benefit of all the shareholders.� Berle and Means had in mind z1n 
O\erarching standa rd that would constrain the enabling system ex post: no 
language in a corporate charter could deny or defeat the fundamental equitable 
control of the court9 Meanwhi !e, enforcement of the equitable limitat i on safely 
>2ould be remitted to the state judiciary. In Serle and Means' view. charter 
competition impacted only statutes, leaving the common la'N of fiduciary dutic:� 
as the one arezt of corporate la\v remaining robust: "[fllexible and realis�Jc., 
judges. "if untrammeled by statute," could be expected to find solutions 1c 
' . ·1 ' � I d lO prur:Jem�; rn;it cl e manuec a rem<: y. 
iNhilc Berk: and tvkans lirnited the trust paradigm's class of beneficiclries UJ 
.\u,lLF .-". HIC!\LL & Ci-\IWI\FR C \!E.'I\S. TilE \lnDFR\ CoRf'OR.·\TlU\ \\!.' Pi\: .. ·.;r 
Pf<.t)PER.TY -L 13\ {Trllibac1it..111 Pub!ishr;r� 1991) ll032). 
'l /J 'It .:'-1::'. 
j() /d:>r!97.::'9�. 
��! 
\_!I 
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the corporation ' s  shareho lders, many of thei r  paradigm's  subsequent 
proponents expanded the zone of beneficiary to debate category (3 ) to inc lude 
other corporate constituents and the p ub l i c  i nterest .  The "publ i c" 
characterizat ion in  Th e Modem Corporation and Privote Property i nvited the 
extension.  So d i d  the book ' s  emphas is  on managerial power: to mid-20th 
century anti-managerial ists, power impl ied responsibi l ity and, given the 
separation o f  ownership and contro l ,  responsi b i l i ty needed to be  imposed in 
law. 1 1  
Events d id not unfo ld  in  accordance with the Berle and Means description, 
however. The "publ ic" characterization never made the theory-pract ice  
transi t ion and the courts stubborn ly  refrained from casting themse l ves in  the 
role of management contro l lers .  F iduciary duty was i n  any event too narrow a 
framework in  \vhich to integrate corporate l aw and management power into the 
w i der social and pol i t ica l  context .  Eventual ly ,  events overtook the trust 
p aradigm. By the 1 970s, new v iews emerged about the best means to the 
generally accepted end of creat ing wealth.  A sense of  national competitive 
failure combined with a ioss of faith in regulatory solutions to undermine the 
trust paradigm. 
fAarket di splaced trust .  The market paradigm rebutted b oth the trust 
paradigm' s  descripti on of separated ownership and contro l and its cal l  for 
regulat ion . This economic perspective recast the firm as an i nc i de n t  o f  
contracting among rational economic actors.  The t1m1 became a series o f  
contracts jo in ing inputs t o  outputs, with equity capitai a s  one o f  the inputs and 
corporate law as a part of the input ' s  govern i ng contract . 1 2  The i mper fec t ions 
i dent ified under the trust paradigm reemerged under the denominat ion ' 'agency 
costs," costs that fi nm must minimize due w the free market ' s  competit ive 
force. Managers vvere n o  longer seen as empowered actors and respons i b i l ity 
was no longer seen as a prob lem.  \Vhen managers L1i l ed , they got removed­
e i ther a host i ie  offeror took o ver  the company and threw them out. ! �  the fi rm 
with a h igh agency·-cost  base fa i led to surv ive in  the product market, or poor 
managers fai led to survive i n  the management labor market .  Their incent ives 
accordingly were focused on long-run product ive success for the fi nT1. . G i ven 
these market d ererrents,  corpora te propert y  aga i n becairte private , the 
regu latory agenda wen t  b lank , and a p<!\vcrful presumption arose against  n e \v 
interventi on. 1 .j 
1 1 . .").;,· R .'d. P H  ��.". D F R  FT .·\ L . . T-\ \ i i \Ci  T H F  G !  ' '; :  CDRrUl(-\TICJ:,; ! . 7 I !  .)/f, ): see also Rob•:i"l . \ .  
Dahl .  GoH:rning ihe (;ianr Corp!ll'lllion. i n  COR PUk.-\TE PU\\-FR i �< .\ \ ! E R I C.-\ :! ( Ralph >�adcr (�..: \-'1:.-nk 
G reen cds .. 1 97 � '1 -
� � - See \·t ichacl Jcnst·:; t"'.:. \\ . i \ J i �uP H .  \ !cckl ing .  The,. :;y :.�(rhe F/r11: · . \ /unugcrial Bchut ·iuf" . .  -ig�:nc_, . 
(""ost.�· unci  ()i rner\-/;i;) Stn�:._·ntn.:. 3 .J . F r :·.: _ EC�) .'\ .  3 l 0 (_ 1 97 6 ) .  
1 3 .  T h i s  po in l  or ig ina•cd l i l  1-i c::n:·y G .  :\ Linne .  \ !e,.·gL·r., und ri!<! .\ iurkc r l( , ; ·  ( . .  l ! ij iUiU[C Cun/roi. n J. 
POL .  ECO \ .  l l  0 ( i 9 6 5 ) .  
/" 0  o o  
1 -� - \V i l l i �lln \\· . Brat ton, T"hi.:· Econulnic Stn:cture I he· iJusr-CnnlrUI.'!trul Cuipunt! iu/ 7 .  :� 7 \1\\ . U .  
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The market paradigm presented an i deo logical  m inor image to the trust 
paradigm and accordingly suited deregulatory policy agen das.  Indeed, that fit 
a lone should h ave canied i t  to unquestioned and continued ascen dancy in 
corporate l aw discussions .  But i t  instead ran into an unant ic ipated public choice 
problem when the enabl ing system transformed itself i n  the process o f  deal ing 
with h o stil e  takeovers . H i storical ly,  c orporate control always had been 
c ontestable  in the trading market. B ut, prior to the 1 980s such contests as 
occurred did not fundamental ly  chal lenge management empowem1ent. Low 
stock market valuations changed th at .  Corporate law responded b y  interposing 
frictions that substanti a l ly  diminished the takeover threat and preserved 
freedom of action for management.  This  undermined the market p aradi gm ' s  
positive story, which re l ied o n  market con tracting t o  i mport incentive 
c ompatib i l i ty to the agency relationship .  
The market paradigm a l so fai led  to synchronize with c orporate law at a 
normative leveL Corporate law seeks to create wealth and l o oks at freedom of 
c ontract only as a means to the  end.  The market paradig m ' s  proponents stressed 
indi vidual freedom and contract as ends in themselves .  But c orporate law i s  not 
a p l ac e were a commi tment to � n d i v i dual freedom csuses a zone of right to be 
identified and protected for its O\Vn sake .  Nor does c orporate l aw ' s  fac i l i tat ion 
of exchange i mply  something approaching the economic ideal  o f  property 
rights in a zone of free contract. Corporate l aw routinely suppresses a l ternative 
contractual anangements i n  order to secur e  i ts  kft- and right-side obj ectives.  
The states ' "enab ling''  codes build on a pair  of c ore mandates .  The delegation 
of power to management is  mandatory ( th e  except i on in Delaware General 
Corporation Law 1 4 1 (a) being inelevant to the govemance o f  l arge firms ) ,  as i s  
management agenda control respecting the tenns of the corporate contract .  
U l timate, albeit  ind i rect, shareholder control also i s  mandated:  one class  of 
shares must retain ful l  voting rights .  I t  a l so should  be noted that corporate law 
evolv·es in an ongoin g process of i dent i r�'ing and correct ing perc e i ved c o n tra ct 
fa i l ures, again toward the end of c learing the fie ld for management freedom of 
act ion and market l iqu id i ty .  State anti -takeover law performs the former 
function.  The federal corporate law regime performs the i atter functioi1, 
protecti ng l iquidity by requiring n;an agement truth-te l l ing.  
If  there w as an era i n  which free contract came close to describ ing 
corporate la1v, i t  wc:s thl� 1 920s,  after N ew Jersey stripped most  o f  the inandates 
, ,  . � . t ' 1 ' \ t h  - h r r� 1 � rrorn 1 ts  corpol·ate c o tJ.e 1 i1 t11e late- . �  century anti .... e ·1 ore '"--- ongress  enactcu tn�� 
federal securities l aws . B ut the mc2ning of free contract in corporate C >Jntets 
\vas •::voiving e ven in  the l 920s a\vay from the Victorian preference for 
ind i v idual choi c -e to\vard a !TH Jrs fac i 1 itc;. t i1.Je: n1ajorJ tarian regi lrte . Sir: iply� dea � -
L .  R L\'. 1 S O .  l 86-90 ( 1 992 ) .  
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mak i n g  by i n s i ders trumped freedom of contract . 1 5  With the except i o n  of a 
bri ef period around twenty years ago, when contractarianism was hot ly  debated 
i n  corporate legal theory, no one has ever thought that the shareholder-manager 
rel ationship could satisfactori ly be dealt with in the legal framework of a 
Victorian dicker over Dobbi n ,  l e ast  of a l l  the Victorians themselves .  
The "nexus of contracts" c orporation, then, never worked as  description.  
The contractar ian s '  descript ive c laims i nstead s erved as talking p oints  i n  a 
wider nom1at ive campaign against regul atory innovation, p articular ly in 
fiduciary la\v. That anti-regulatory campaign retains v i tal i ty ,  pursui n g  the dual  
goals of management freedom of action as  against  regul ators and shareholder 
choice as against management.  Interest ingly,  the campaign now proceeds on 
both fronts as a rearguard action . A qua11er century of contractarian 
re inforcement of the primacy of state l aw toward the end of p rotecting 
managemen t freedom from regulat ion m ade no difference when a C ongress 
fri ghtened by voter disgust with c orporate scandals enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.  The batt le  over shareholder choice was l o s t  during the 1 9 8 0 s ,  when ant i­
takeover regulat ion chi lled the market for corporate contro l .  Although state l aw 
n e ver a ccords management freedom of action an absol ute trump over 
shareholder cho ice  and mediates between the two, the underlay of charter 
c o mpet i tion -vve i ghts the mediation so as to render i t  relat ively i mperv i ous  to the  
stronger nom1ative c l aims of the con tractarians and their economic theory of 
agency.  
No overarching meta-theory has succeeded the trust and market paradign1s 
to domin ate think ing in the fie l d .  Even as welfare consequent ia l i sm preva i l s ,  
today n o  master s e t  of instruct ions drives theoretical  discus s i ons about the 
;nean s to the encl. Today ' s  theori sts tend to th ink in terms of i ncentive 
:::on;patib i l i ty and to confront incentive problems piecemeal .  [vl anagement se lf· 
deaL ing reemerges as a seri o u s  problem.  The tms t  paradigm ' s  stress on 
fiduci ary i n structions pers ists as a result .  And i ts  separation of ownership  and 
contro l remains in the operative description, no longer absolutely determi nat ive 
but st i l l  salient.  The market paradig m ' s  deregulatory presumpti on retains force ,  
o l though fewer and fewer observers look to spontaneous order to soh:e agency 
problems.  The n e x u s  of contracts s lowly recedes.  But i t  wi l l  n ever di sappear 
because c o n tract  remains vvhat it always has b een : a s i gni ficant component of 
comonue arrangements . Meanwh i l e ,  hierarchy bas returned to legal 
descript ion�: of the firm. Economics remains the dominarrt imerdi s(: :tp l inary 
;·t';fercn L but the rnetbodologi cal menu i s  expanding.  As ever, financ i al res t. i lts 
--- --- - --·---·-· ··- · -
-
···-· · · - - - · - ·
-
- -
--
-·--· 
1 5 . Tit(� de \ · c!:._· .. p;:-!e i1t tJf th·...: Ia\\" of corporate reorganization fo! I O \\··:d sin1 i lar  ! in('S .  Bcfc:rt the 
B :l l: "-:nqJtcy :\ct of i 93--L the t�deral courts'  equity receivership tnai !�tained for.11nl fide l i r;: to i ; :d i \· idual  
d-.oic<: •::\ en '.!S i i  ,;ought i n  pract ice  to fac i l i tate recap i ta l izat ions on a cram-down bc1 s i s .  [t tc>ok 
C c.·ngr·� �-; s i <. ;n�i.l i t-den··.?tniun during th•: Depress ion to  surni(.)Unt the conceptual ba;Ti ·..;r  Jr1 d iJ"l: ny\l_H·:: ::: 
rc !I : rn e .  
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in h is tory are the primary dete rm inants. Meanwhi le ,  debates retain a d i a lect ic  
qual i ty ,  focused on the binaries in  debate category (4) . 
IV.  THE BOUNDARIES OF THE fiRM AND LEGITIMACY 
The Cri teria seek to touch a l l  the b ases,  e mergi ng as an exhaustive catalog 
of normative poss i b i l i t i e s .  In so  d oing they sweep in precepts s uggest ing that 
good l av\ S for bus iness associat ions s hould fol l ow from and synchronize w i t h  
precepts preva i l ing i n  the wider system of p ub l ic and private l aw .  They d o  th i s  
a s  they perform the ir  pri mary j ob o f  estab l i sh ing,  encasi n g ,  and regul ating 
bus iness  organi zat ions .  Thus do fai rness,  redistri but ion,  and protec t i on o f  the 
weak ( I(C ) .  ( E ) ,  and ( F ) )  vie w i th cost reduct ion ( IV),  and corporate po,vcr and  
leg i t imacy i n  society (III )  shmv u p  a s  concerns coequal w i t h  wealth creation 
( l l ) .  
C o rporate doctrine,  however, i s  for t h e  most part impervious t o  legi t i macy 
concerns. Corporate l aw does not attempt to confe r  l eg i t imacy,  e v<::n as i t  does 
bestow l i m ited l i ab i l i ty .  The inco rp orating states and the i r  regime of general  
incorpora t i o n  long ago surrendered substantive review of the b u s i n ;�ss proj ect  
i n  order to c l e a r  the fi eld for act ion .  Legit imacy i s  left to management  lo gam��r  
or lose  depend ing on ho\v wel l i t  does i ts  j ob,  cmd the perfo nm:nce cr i tcri0n i S  
fin anc i al .  Th is  ongoing process ope ra tes firm by firm and across  n rms as a 
vvho l .:: .  State corporate law fac i l itates the process withou t  detem1 in !ng  the  
res u l t .  ! t  wants msnagers to succeed and so empo\vers them. B m  i l  ant i c i pznes 
· '  . ' ' . . I t I t' ' 1 1 ' . ' I <'· ra1 1 ure wnen lt reqw p:;s at , eas one c ass o snare,1o , oers to retain tile v u te.  · 
Financi al fai l ure also tends to p rompt add i t ional securit ies  reg:.t la t io l" .  T:1e 
venue i s  the :; e c uri t i e s regime rather than state I aw for three n:c: S C1'.S F i rst ,  
f�1ilure reg i s ters :·nost c l e arly in  s tock prices;  secondly,  financi a l l y  emb :3. iTet � :� �:d  
managers have a tendency to fall out  o f  compliance w i tl1 the  ln<ii ld:H(Y) 
cl i sc losur;:; regi rn e :  and .. th irdly, c h arter competit ion tends to \.et:p t l v :  s t :.: t ,: s  �' U t  
of  th <:: c n forc:::'ment  b u s i n ess .  Contrariwise,  the pol iti c a l  c iout uf n12.r:ager.:, 
waxes during strong stock market s ,  fac i l i tating access w Congres�' and s late 
legis latur·::s f(:Jr benefi c i a l  regulat ion (or dereguiat ion) .  
Rezd -wo!' ld  stuxe:;s and fail ure thus matt(:r  a grc� at deal  in COTO;- ;_Hc l::n\ .. 
dr:fi n i.ng lcgit i rnac>· ·  But legit in1acy i n  the h igher  s� rL:=:.t: of respons i b l t� 
empo\verment  nt2tkrs l i tt le .  A n egat i v e proof i s  offered .  f f  leg i t i macy mal krcd, 
corporate \'./U u l d  find some plausib l e  way to assign respon sicJ i l i : :' for  
corpor?te extemcd i t ies .  Consider i n  Th i s  regard the  l<.tw of p i e>' �: i ng the / (: i : .  
\vh 1 ch h o i ds ou l tb c poss jbihty o f  assigning respons ib i 1 i ty fc:-{· tortiOlL·� 
e:x-. ter�:1al � t i i�· s to the fir1n � s  shareholders . These rules n1akc per±e\_·t sc :l.sc  \Vh ·::t: 
v1e ,ved +'r'JlTl �he poii!t o f  view of class ica l  doctrinal theory. l_ i m i k'cl � i �>b i i i �..,, 
: 6 . L c; �;,:rs i :� �! g.i··.\� i :  t inn get a backstop of sorts frorn tlle t�cJer�d b�1nknrptcy 
t;r:r:�, �: �· :J \\ .;1:�; ) :: .  !h�  t!':.�;�d O\·�:r ti rnr:.· has been ks�� forg i •: i n g .  
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comes w ith entity status ,  and can be lost i f  the shareholders fai l  to respect the 
enti ty ' s  legal eannarks :  if the firm is run as an "agent or instmmenta l i ty" of i ts  
shareholders rather than as a separate enti ty, the shareholders ' l i mited l i ab i l ity 
can be lost .  Yet, viewing the matter from the point of view of  economic 
substance, agency is what the enterpri se i s  all about. There resul ts  a l icense to 
externali ze maintainable by rote observance of formal i t ies .  The resul t  i s  
indefensible a s  a matter of economic theory, and questionable under a long  l i st 
of Cri teria :  avo idance of harshness ( I (B ) ) ,  redistribution ( I (E) ) ,  protection of 
the weak ( l (F) ) ,  al location of loss  to the proper person ( I (  G)) ,  evenhandedness 
( l (I )) ,  legitimation of management ' s  ro le and exercise of pow·er ( I I I ( E) ) ,  and 
abuse of povver ( I I I (F ) ) .  Yet the core purposes of cap i tal-raising and freedom of 
action are much enhanced. 
If l egitimacy mattered, corporate law would not draw a bright l ine between 
ins iders and outsiders, disavowing a l l responsib i l i ty for the latter. It would tind 
ways to bring disempowered constituents into the tent .  I ts refusal so to do dates 
back at l east to Dodge v. Ford Jv!otor Co . 1 7  Such exceptions as have opened up 
serve the end of enhanc ing management ' s  freedom of action rather than the end 
·) f in tegrating corporate govemance into the wider social sett l ement embodied 
in regulation . Thus do the A LI Prin ciples of Corporote Governance describe 
the firm ' s  obj ect ive with the h edged phrase ' 'with a view to enhanc ing 
corporate profi t  and shareholder gain . " 1 x  The hedge permits management to 
effect di stributions with in  the firm, rel axing the shareholder value nom1 at the 
shareholders ' expense without imposing duties of social  responsibi l i ty .  The 
same goes for the corporate charity permission and the admiss ion of const i tuent 
i n terest in  takeover defense contexts .  The exceptions impl icate red istribution 
( I ( E) )  :md protecti on of the weak (l(F ) ) ,  but only on a spi l l over basis .  
Corporate law ' s  caval ier  inflict ion of tortious cxtemal ities and insistence on 
contr2,c t as the means of engagement by outsiders are to lerated only because 
ou tside regulation makes significant adj ustments to amel iorate unacceptable  
res u l ts .  Labor, environmental, and consumer protection regulation a l l  serve th is  
end, not to  mention the ant i trust  l aws and the Internal Revenue Code.  Their  
common puqJose i s  to COi"!tain the discretion vested in managers by corporate 
ia�v .  Thi s  outs ide regu iat ion makes the world safe for the corporate law 
dek:gati on and thereby makes fi nns and corporate l avv l egi timate by 
i nd irect i ,Jn .  Th is  inside/outside settlement dates back to  the  early-20th century, 
S L\r'; i ·.,-;_; j the Depress ion intact, and today seems more stable than ever. 
Sti l l ,  the system is fu l ly  defensib le  in theory only on the assumption that the 
iXi.ckstop regu!ations adequately protect the pubiic interest .  The assumpt ion 
! 7 . 1 70 N . \V . 66B t)'ihch. ! 9 1 9) .  
i 8 .  ,'\:\ ' E R IC..\:\ LA\\' l\STITUTE.  P R J :..:C I P Lt::S O F  CORPOR.-\TE GO\TR:; ·\ \Ci: A "\ .:·. L Y S I S  . .>,:;o 
R. :.< :J�- 1 \ l i: :< D.·\T !O'<S 2 0 1  ( ! 994) .  
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remains h ighly contestab le ,  c aus ing the same to fol low for corporate la<.v · s  
investi ture of  power t o  g o  forth to inj ure and exploit I t  fol lows that observers 
who seek to i ntegrate corporate law with in  models of  democratic society arc 
never sat isfied wi th  the ins ide/outs i de settlement Each generation renew·s the 
c ategory ( 3 )  debates conceming const i tuents and respons ib i l i ty in the teeth of 
the stable doctrinal settlement. The critics draw l ibera l ly  on the Criteria. They 
would avoi d  harshness ( ! ( B ) ) ,  promote fairness (I( C)), protect const i tuent  
expectations ( l (D) ) ,  redi stribute wealth av,ray from managers and shareholders 
( l ( E ) ) ,  protect the weak (I (F)) ,  promote evenhandedness ( I ( ! ) ) .  insi st  on ful l  
d isc losure of  the  socia l  consequences of corporate acts ( l ( J ) ) , and promote 
pub l i c  involvement in bus iness ( I I I (C ) ) ,  all toward the end of  l e g i tim i z i ng 
management power ( I I I ( E ) ) .  
This  avvkward system c an b e  defended, and the Cri teri a bear o n  the c a s e .  
Caveat emptor ( I I (G))  l ooms large : if  one i s  a const i tuent who does not  enjoy 
the special protect ion of one of the supplemental regulatory regimes. caveat 
emptor is a l l  corporate l aw holds o ut Reference to the enforcement of J!ri vak 
bargains ( I ( A ) )  is more problemat i c .  It is true that \Neal th transf::rs i�·nm 
employees and sen i or security holders to managers and sharehulck:r:; :.1r� 
defended in contractu2l  tenns .  But  to look at  the j uri sprudence is t o  sec l'<-: �. u l ts  
obtained through fom:al i st ic  i nterpretat ion of the bargams '� onte : 1h . 
I nte rpretat ion proceeds with  no thought of avoiding harshn es s ( l( B ) ) ,  b .� i ng  h i r  
( l ( C )) ,  being evenhanded ( l ( l )) ,  protect ing the weak ( I ( F ) ) ,  or, in som2 •.:ases.  
even effectuating the parties '  expectat ions .  Formal ism prevai ls ,  maki ng 
winners of the e mpowered and losers of the powerless .  The jurispn:ck�nce 
sm irks i n  i ts  compl i c i ty . In corporate law, w i nning has  i t s  rriv i l eges < J t l cl 
opt imal i ty i s  always Kaldor-H icks .  
The  bes t  th at can be s a i d  i s  tha t  coherence i s  enhanc ed . The c o n s t i l.!.l •.:: : : ts  
l eam that they need !o go sornevvhere other than corporate l c:w for ass i s rcm·.:t .  
Corporate law remains unc l uttered w i th comp lex i n structio n s  thac m i g h t  i n h i b i t  
freedom of act ion or have unin tended effects,  triggering uncerta i nty [ j i ( F ) )  
Corporate actors can re ly on the  divis ion o f  regulatory function  ( 1(0 ) .  l V ( D )) .  
and things go much  more smoothly and cheap l y  ( I V( B )  and ( C) ;  TJ :,�r·� i s  1 
leg i t imacy po i nt t o o .  The \\·i despread acceptance of  corporate l a w ' ::; L\\..' k  \' i' 
evenhandedness does  n o t  rea l l y  fol l mv hom deep ly held co ntn<.: tar i :\ l l :J ::: h: f �; 
and free market part i sansh i p .  \\ e value the end. not the mean�: .  ::t i l l_; 
economic opponun it;; .  C o q)orate I::nv ' s  consequential  appc�1 l  to w':- :o: i t :J ,� , -�':'t i \ ,: · : J  
regi sters pos itively in  t h e  p o l i ty a t  �:ome deep leve L T h e  median \ oTu : : ->>:v:> ,, 
system that aggress ively di vides us into w i nners and losers :>c tong :L i t  
identifies v.:irh the \_\! i nl �.tcr� ,  o r  a t  l east holds out a hop;� f�'Jr c plac::- r c  i . 1 1 ::r  
c h i l dren in  the \:.: inner' s C i rc l e .  
,iJ l of th i s  s u ffi c e s  W p u t  t h e  b;Eden of persuasion on the ,�ri : i c :; _  · ! · :1 ' . 
n ever n1anag�d to produce Jli a.l te111ative n1CH.ie 1  thct surn-lCl �.-t �·� t.�; . __ � ;:· c�· . : c· � .. � 
; j  
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obj ections and resonates in the context of our social settlement. They seem 
always to end up in an awkward a l liance of convenience with management 
apologists, taking Dodd's side in the Ber le-Dodd debate of 1 93 2 . 1 9  In that 
famous encounter, two progressives differed on the question as to how society 
should deal with management power. Dodd had us modeling managers as 
statesmen, appealing to their better instincts. Unfm1unatel y  for Dodd 's  case, 
managers have not hewn to the statesmanlike path. Berle made an agency 
argument: managers had to be control led somehow and imposed fidelity to  the 
shareho lder interest was the best means to the end. The next part takes up that 
case. 
V. AGENCY 
Agency is corporate legal theory 's flashpoint topic. The doctrine itself 
tr iggers the debate by simultaneously dispensing the two organizational 
models: entity, which privileges management empowerment;  and agency, 
w hich suggests shareholder-cen tered controls on management discretion. To 
i sGbte the po i nts of tension, return to the left side/right side p icture of corporate 
lmv ' s  o bj e c t ives .  
On the left side of the balance sheet ,  corporate l aw mandates delegation and 
i nvests management vvith discretion, le tting success or failure emerge in 
practice. It then makes a second  mandate, remitting the vote for the board of 
directors to the shareholders, expecting the vote 's  aggressive exercise in case of 
L1i lure .  But the shareholder col lective action problem makes the dual 
dispensation problematic. Two great points of conflict arise. One goes to 
shareholder access and the proxy solicitation process. The other concerns the 
ho�; t i le  takeover. The en t i ty characterization and the end of encouraging risk­
mkmg and long-term investment suggest that existing baniers to shareholder 
i merwnt ion well serve the end of wealt h  creation. The agency characterization, 
\V t t h  i ts  corol l aries of principal contro l and shareholder choice, suggest that a 
stronger th t·eat of removal and shareholder l egislative intervent ion  would 
1mpro \•e  opc:rating results . 
Turning to the right side of the balance sheet ,  corporate law protects 
l i qu i d i ty ,  L1c i l itating exit  as the primary shareholder defense against adverse 
.; e lect ion problerns .  1\!Ianagement proponents focus on th is ,  suggesting that the 
\V::d l  Stree t  Rule still suffices to protect the shareholder interest (and 
s i nnc l taneously questioning the intensity of federal regulations designed to keep 
the exit d oor open) .  Bm corporate l aw also seeks to reduce the cost  of capital 
•J l i  th e r ight s ide, even as i t  accords management discretioE over financing 
Sec Adolf  .. �. Bcde.  Jt· .. ,cor Jh'unn c·o!j)(Jrori! ,\/unagt.:T.1_.; .·ire Trusret: ... ;_ A .Vurc. -tS H .-\RY. L .  
;�, fe\". ! 3 6 �  ( ! 93 2 ) :  E .  .\•l erri ck Dodd. Jr  _ _  For TYhom A re Corporme .\lunuge:;·s li·us!ee:s ? 45 HARV. L .  
R f:_ '. . l � - � 5  ( i ;_ ) ] � ':.  
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dec i s i ons.  This  obj ective again raises the takeover quest ion,  \Vi th shareholder 
choice advocates pointing to the cost  of equity c ap ital  to counter the left-side 
c laim of perverse effects o n  investment incentives made b y  management ' s  
defender s .  Right-side questions come up about other terms o f  the agency 
re l ation as wel l .  Opportuni st ic  managers c an s e l f-deal at the expense of the 
marginal  interest holder, causing the cost of equity c ap ital  to rise.  To the extent 
that the l aw can i ntervene to c ontrol such c onduct cost-effect ively,  it arguabl y  
should d o  s o ,  even though the i ntervention entai l s  review of management 
deci s ions and constrains freedom of action.  Here we enter the terri tory of the 
duty of loyalty and the ongoing and a lways c ontested j ob of drawing the 
territorial l ine between business j udgment and transactional  scm tiny.  
Resolut i on s  of disp utes over the tenns of the agency comprise the core 
territory of the corporate law mediation . We have mediation rather than 
so luti ons because both sides tell p l ausib le  stories  about wea l th i mpacts .  
Apparent b u t  unverified welfare gains and perverse incentives crop up 
everywhere in th i s  v ic inity-the negative effects of management  entrenchment 
v i e  with those of the short-term foc us of inst i tutional shareh o l ders; the 
deachvcight costs of management pocket- l i ning vie with those i mp l i cated by 
systems of enforcemen t ;  and the benefic ial fi nancia l  effects of equal retums for 
equa l l y  s ituated shareho lders vie with the negative effects of constraints on 
transact ional  freedom . We have no empi rical means to determine correct, 
Jcross- the-board outc omes for d i sputes such as these . But under the 
deregulatory presumpti on b equeathed by the contractar ians , the theoretical  
burden of persuas i on l ies w i th those arguing for regu l atory i nnovat ion .  
Contemporary rrends i n  the practice fol l ow suit .  Under the deregulatory 
presumption, th e focus devol ves on govemance processes,  with heavy re l iance  
b ·:: ing  placed o n  the i nstitution o f  the board of directors . S e l f-regulatory 
strmegies prevaiL their p l a usibi l i ty bolstered by the appearan ce of activist 
;nst i tut ional in vestors. We see t h i s  i n  the pro l i feration of vol untary codes of 
good practice and accompanying hortatory discuss ions  among govemance 
.c:: xperts.  We a l so see i t  i n  De l aware fi duciary l aw, whi c h  rel i es ever more 
h <:av i l y  on internal  processes to solve confl ict  of interest  problems.  At the same 
t i r::r:., h igh-profi le compl iance fa i l ures by unsuccessful managers have 
p rompted polit icians to embed s e l f-regulatory governance agenda i tems in the 
[t;deral mandatory disclosure syste m .  The overa l l  result  i s  anything but 
deregula t ory. feeding our dia lecti cal debates .  
The  Criteria echo t h e  dialectic .  As \Ve fi l l  i n  t h e  i nevitable omitted tenns in  
the c1gency re1ationship. w e  cou l d reference the Criteria t o  res train o urse l ves ,  
::rnpha.s i z i ng th:� enforcement of p rivate bargains (I(A))  and fn::edorn of act ion  
( l(J-I ) ) , and res o l v ing doubts against regulatory innovat ion by protectin g  
expectations i n  announced govemmental pol ic ies  (I(D)) .  A l ternatively, \ve 
·:o u [d enforce the t rad it ional regime of fiduciary prohibi t ion , gui ded by fairness 
7 '  , .)  
Berkeley Business Law Journal Vo l . 2 : 1 , 2005 
(I(C)) ,  the avoidance of harshness ( I (B ) ) ,  protection of the weak (l(F)) ,  and 
evenhandedness ( I ( I ) ) .  Continu ing this back and forth ,  we coul d  tum to se l f­
regulation, maximiz ing se lf-enforcement ( IV(B) )  and l imit ing the cost of  
government operation ( IV(A)) .  B ut i f  we do that to  excess, we end up re lying 
more and more on the gatekeepers-outside directors, auditors, and 
counsel-increasing private comp liance costs ( IV(C)) .  I n  addit ion , i n  a 
dynamic environment, se lf-regu lat ion under j udicia l  supervis ion tends to l ead 
to unstable  case l aw, as seen in  Delaware in  recent decades .  This traverses the 
notion that vve should not change the rules  ( I I (F ) ,  IV(D)) .  I n  the present 
environment, the only criterion  bearing on agency that I would  predict would 
gamer universal endorsement  i s  ful l  disc losure ( I ( J ) ) .  And even as to that, a 
mandatory/enab l ing dispute would break out soon enough. 
CONCLUSION 
We w i l l  not know what good corporate law is unti l we have a verifiab le ,  
general l y  accepted template for a product ive governance.  M eanwhi le ,  we 
debate our opinions on the matter, opinions h igh ly  sensi t i ve to results in  rea] 
v.'or ld firms .  Caut ion prevai ls ,  favoring the inherited l egal context .  
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